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CARLOS A. NORTON TO WORTHINGTON

Chillicothe Feb. 15. 1813 -

Dear Sir,

I have recd your favor of the 4th instant. As, I presume, many of the appointments will be nade, previous to the close of the present session of Congress -- it will be too late, for me to know, by letter from Col. Cass, what are his ideas on the justness of my pretensions to an appointment. How- ever, when here, he conversed with me fully on the subject -- and gave me to understand, that there would be no difficulty in the gratification of my wish. Previous to the notification of his own appointment, he would, it is presumable, feel a delicacy in writing much in relation to the subject.

The other day, I received a letter from him of the date of Feb. 3d., in reply to one of mine relating to another person, in which, he observes "So soon as I receive any intelligence which mar be interesting to you, I will write you."

I do not know what staff appointments there are to be made -- except the regimental staff -- which is formd from the subalterns of a regiment. I do not wish an appointment of a higher grade than a captaincy - and lower, I certainly would not accept.

Unsolicited by me, some of my friends have forwarded a recommendation in my favor.

I w as, this day, at your house, a few moments. Your family are well. The last news from the army, is, that Harrison's force is concentrated at the Rapids. I think it doubtful whether he will advance, at present. Probably, he does not think himself strong enough. I fear, nothing will be done this winter. The advance, and defeat of Winchester, have very seriously affected the operations of Harrison. Even had Winchester been victorious, I should ever have thought, the movement to the river Raisin, to have been rash, and unmilitary -- more particularly, against an enemy so active as the Indians. He was more than 36 riles in advance of the main body of our own army -- and 18 miles only, from the strongest British fortress. He was destitute of artillery -- and 'dis force much inferior to wlhat the enemy could, & did, bring against hin. His troops were brave -- but, under such circumstances, I do not perceive, on what principle, they could have been expected to have been victorious. However, the less said about it, the better -- there are enough who will find fault, at any rate -- and since the backwoodsmen are implicated, I think, we had better smooth it over the best way we can.

I am, respectfully,

C. A. Norton

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