|
|
|
|
JOHN SLOANE TO WORTHINGTON Canton 3 February 1813 Dear Sir Before this cones to hand you will be informed of the defeat of the van of the N.W. army and of its surrender with Genl Winchester at its head. Thi.s will be a fresh plume in the enemies crown & is a lamentable circumstance for the state of Ohio, for independent of the loss in itself considered it will tend to spirit up the indians and make them more confident, as it comports with what the enemy have always said of their own prowess and our inferiority. It does seem that we are doomed to experience nothing but disaster and disgrace where ever our arms are turned. I am induced to believe that the ensuing summer will be a period of great trouble to the people of this state for let the result of the expedition under Genl. Harrison be what it may a large body of our militia must be stationed on our frontiers to protect them against the savages -- When I reflect on the kind of troops that compose the North Western army I confess I am by no means sanguine about success for although by our newspaper puffs it would appear that that they are equal to the legions of Bonaparte it is within my own knowledge that they are nearly without dicipline (unless that is comprehended in the manual exercise) and that the officers with a few exceptions are destitute of all kinds of military knowledge thus circumstanced of what avail is courage when they have to contend with an enemy who has made a profession of war all their lives, it is useless to deceive ourselves any longer this idea of our bravery during all before it is likely to prove fatal to us as it makes us in- differ .nt to the use of the only means that can give us success. The ground distence to be the seat of war in which the N W army has to act is peculiarly situated to our disadvantage in as much as whilst the enemy have command of the lake there is but one pass into it and that through a country altogether un- productive and subject to the attacks of the indians [illeg.] in the one aided and the British by means of their shipping on the other for a distance of 70 miles. To secure this pass so that provisions and other suplies may advance in safety would require a force little inferior to that which might be requisite for the reduction of the enemies fortresses. From this view of the subject I think it of the utmost importance to the nation and to the state of Ohio in particular that a force be provided on the Lake sufficient to overwhelm that of the enemy on the first opening of the spring nothing short of this will effect the object for whilst they have the command of the water they will not only compel us to dray all our supplies through the mud but can transport their troops with such rapidity that they will allways frustrate our plans by landing troops as our [illeg.] or making diversions in places where we are not prepared to meet them & thus by means of a few troops herrass our troops so that nothing can effectually be done. I should say that if the water remains in their hands and they are not impeded with success at Niagara 10,000 men such as we have them will be none too many for our purpose at Malden for if even their force remains below untill after the [illeg.] of Cowardice of Smyth exploded there is time sufficient to march by land as it is not half the distenceon that side of the lake. they will act with more energy than is to be expected from troops who march against them -- besides they need not wait for Baggage or provisions be- cause there is a stock of both at Malden, Such is the manner in which our affairs have been ordered likely to be conducted that they may with safety detect tihe greater part of their forces from fort Erie for was it every known they might reinforce from Quebec I had almost said England) before we could do any thing offensive in that Quarter. From all these considerations and many more that 166 |
| Ohio_Historical_Society - 1982 Velma Ave. - Columbus, OH 43211 - © 1998 All Rights Reserved. |